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Abstract 
It has been controversial whether incumbents are punished more for a bad economy than they are 
rewarded for a good economy due to mixed results from previous studies on one or handful 
number of countries. This paper makes an empirical contribution to this lingering question by 
conducting extensive tests on whether this asymmetry hypothesis is a cross-nationally 
generalizable phenomenon using all currently available modules of the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems survey from 122 elections in 42 representative democracies between 1996 and 
2016, as well as macro-economic indicators and individual-level economic perception. In 
general, this paper finds little support for the asymmetry hypothesis; although the evidence of 
such asymmetric economic voting is found in some subpopulations using certain economic 
indicators, these conditional effects are largely inconsistent, suggesting that it is still safe to 
assume a linear relationship between economic conditions and support for the incumbent.1   
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Previous literature on economic voting suggests that voters tend to punish an incumbent when 
the economy is bad more than they reward him or her when the economy is good, an expectation 
I refer to as the “the asymmetry hypothesis” or “asymmetric economic voting” (Bloom & Price 
1975; Claggett 1986; Nannestad & Paldam 1997). This phenomenon is also known as 
a“grievance asymmetry” or “negativity effect” (Lau 1985; Nannestad & Paldam 1997). 
However, some studies do not find support for this phenomenon (Kiewiet 1983; Lewis-Beck 
1988). Thus, the evidence for the asymmetry hypothesis in economic voting is still inconclusive 
(Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013).2  
Given that past studies find evidence of this asymmetry in some countries at some points 
in time using certain economic indicators, but not in other contexts, the generalizability of 
asymmetric economic voting remains an unanswered question, and most of existing voting 
models continue to assume a linear effect of economic conditions on support for the incumbent. 
However, if the asymmetry hypothesis holds and the relationship between economic conditions 
and support for the incumbent is non-linear, several important theoretical implications manifest. 
First, as economic conditions fluctuate, the incumbent loses more support in every downturn 
than he accrues in each upturn, which suggests that economic stability is the key to maintaining 
office. In addition, since the incumbent is more likely to lose than to gain support by managing 
the economy, there is a cost of ruling which explains turnover in government (Nannestad and 
                                                          
2 Similar inconsistency is found in the literature studying the effect of economy on the popularity 
of or the attitude toward the government or the incumbent: The asymmetric pattern is found in 
Berlemann, Enkelmann, and Kuhlenkasper (2015) and Mueller (1970) while it is not observed in 
Campbell et al. (1960), Enkelmann (2014), Headrick & Lanoue (1991) and Hibbs (1974). 
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Paldam 1997, 92-94). Because of both the lack of empirical clarity concerning and the potential 
implications of asymmetric economic voting, it is important to assess the generalizability of the 
asymmetry hypothesis. This paper makes an empirical contribution by testing the asymmetry 
hypothesis with the largest cross-national data set we have come to study the asymmetry so far 
and with various macro- and micro-level economic indicators with multiple thresholds, and by 
investigating the contexts and constituencies in which the pattern is most likely to emerge. 
There are many potential reasons why extant studies have yielded mixed results. For 
example, inconclusiveness may be a consequence of case selection; some countries or elections 
may be more susceptible to the asymmetry hypothesis than others. This problem can be 
addressed in two ways. First, we can include a broad cross-section of countries and examine 
whether such asymmetry persists as a general trend across representative democracies. The 
second is to consider contextual- and individual-level variables that may condition the 
asymmetric pattern, such as whether asymmetric economic voting is more likely to manifest 
across different systems of government or among individuals who are co-partisans of the 
governing coalition. 
Mixed results for the asymmetry hypothesis may also stem from differences in the level 
of observation selected for analysis.  Whereas some studies employ aggregate-level data using 
objective economic indicators, others utilize individual-level data using survey respondents’ 
subjective economic evaluations.  For example, in the U.S. elections, aggregate-level studies by 
Bloom and Price (1975) and Claggett (1986) find evidence for asymmetric economic voting, but 
Kiewiet (1983) using the individual-level American National Election Studies does not. Still, the 
results are not conclusive among individual-level analyses: Nannestad and Paldam (1997) find 
support for the asymmetry in Danish election surveys while Kiewiet (1983) in the American 
4 
 
context and Lewis-Beck (1988) in a cross-national European sample does not.  
Both of these potential explanations for ambiguous results are intertwined and should be 
addressed simultaneously.  In order to address the issue of case selection, this paper utilizes 
Modules 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) covering 122 
elections in 42 countries from 1996 to 2016, to test whether the asymmetry hypothesis holds 
across democracies cross-nationally. Additionally, it investigates whether the magnitude of 
asymmetric economic voting varies across certain contextual- or individual-level conditions. The 
contextual-level conditions that are analyzed include the level of economic development, the 
maturity of the democratic regime, the system of government, and the partisan composition of 
the government. Further, individual-level affiliation with the incumbent’s party is considered as 
an individual-level moderator.  To address the issue of case selection, this paper models 
asymmetric economic voting with three different macroeconomic indicators and individual 
voters’ perceptions of economic conditions.  Additionally, the paper utilizes multiple thresholds 
of good and bad economic conditions to check the robustness of the findings. 
In summary, this paper makes three novel empirical contributions to the economic voting 
literature: 1) it analyzes the phenomenon across the largest number of countries tested so far 
using various indicators for economic conditions and thresholds to delineate positive and 
negative economic conditions, 2) it explores how several contextual- and individual-level  
variables moderate  voters’ asymmetric responses to economic conditions, and 3) it finds no 
systematic evidence in support of the asymmetry hypothesis. 
 
 
5 
 
1. Theoretical background 
The negativity effect refers to a psychological phenomenon concerning how people tend to 
weigh negative information more heavily than positive information in various information-
processing tasks (Aragones 1997, 189). In political science, this negative effect is found in 
studies on turnout and voting (Aragones 1997; Kernell 1977), attitude formation toward electoral 
candidates in U.S. elections (Holbrook et al. 2001; Lau 1982, 1985), support for the government 
and government officials (Berlemann, Enkelmann, and Kuhlenkasper 2015; Mueller 1970), 
electoral campaigns (Fridkin and Kenney 2004), and news coverage and public opinion (Soroka 
2006). When applied to economic voting, the negativity effect, which I refer to as the asymmetry 
hypothesis, suggests that voters tend to punish the incumbent for a bad economy at a greater 
extent than they reward him or her for a good economy (Hypothesis 1). 
Scholars have suggested largely three possible reasons for this asymmetric effect.3 First, 
psychologists argue that it is a general phenomenon of human behavior that negative stimuli are 
perceived to be non-normative, more salient, more easily remembered, and weighed more 
heavily when making judgments (Fiske 1980; Kanouse & Hanson 1972; Kanouse 1984). Second, 
loss-aversion in behavioral economics implies that people tend to suffer losses more intensely 
than they enjoy equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Third, the predominance of 
negative news, which may be a result of the relative salience of the negativity that psychologists 
suggest or the institutional function of the mass media as a watchdog, is another potential factor 
                                                          
3 See Kanouse and Hanson (1972), Kanouse (1984), and Lau (1985) for more discussion. 
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amplifying the asymmetric electoral behavior (Soroka 2006). These mechanisms are not 
necessarily competing but may work simultaneously (Lau 1985).  
These theories, however, are not particularly useful to predict the contexts in which 
asymmetric economic voting manifests. However, past studies on heterogeneity in economic 
voting show that the prevalence of economic voting behavior is conditioned by the political and 
economic contexts surrounding a given election in a given country. I draw on several lines of 
extant research to generate hypotheses on moderating effects of political and economic contexts 
on economic voting. In essence, I expect that in systems where economic voting, with the 
symmetric effect of economic conditions assumed, is found to be stronger the asymmetry is more 
likely to be pronounced if it is the true nature of the relationship between the economy and 
voting for the incumbent. 
First, Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest that incumbents are more likely to be rewarded 
or punished based on their economic performance in systems with greater “clarity of 
responsibility.” The authors measure the clarity of responsibility, which describes the extent to 
which the government controls the economy, by aggregating five variables: lack of voting 
cohesion of a major governing party or parties, an opposition committee chair, significant 
bicameral opposition, a minority government, and the number of government parties. Analyzing 
102 elections in 19 industrialized democracies, they find evidence of economic voting in 
countries with a high level of clarity of responsibility but not in those with a low level of clarity 
of responsibility. Subsequent research reaffirms the moderating effect of the clarity of 
responsibility on economic voting (Akarca & Tansel 2007; Anderson 1995; Duch & Stevenson 
2008; Hobolt et al. 2011; Nadeau et al. 2002; Palmer & Whitten 2003; Tilley et al. 2008; Tillman 
2008; van der Brug et al. 2007; Whitten & Palmer 1999). Thus, I expect that asymmetric 
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economic voting will be strongest in a single party majority government and weakest in a multi-
party minority government such that the order of strength will be as follows: single party 
majority > single-party minority or multi-party majority > multi-party minority (Hypothesis 2).4 
Second, apart from the clarity of responsibility, students of economic voting have also 
investigated institutional variations across and within democratic regimes. First, Hellwig and 
Samuels (2007a) compare economic voting patterns among pure and semi-presidential systems 
and parliamentary systems, arguing that, while the clarity of responsibility of a political system 
accounts for voters’ ability to assign responsibility for economic conditions, the extent to which 
voters can act on their judgment is substantially restricted by constitutional design. For example, 
while executives are directly elected in presidential or semi-presidential systems, in a 
parliamentary system, executives are selected and held accountable by members of parliament, 
not voters, such that voters cannot hold executives in parliamentary systems accountable directly 
even though the attribution of responsibility is clear. Their findings suggest that electoral 
accountability for the economy is stronger in separation-of-power systems than in parliamentary 
systems. Thus, I expect that asymmetric economic voting will be stronger in presidential systems 
than in parliamentary systems (Hypothesis 3). 
                                                          
4 For the modules 1, 2 and 3, I constructed a clarity of responsibility measure following the 
original coding rule by Powell and Whitten (1993). However, neither the combined measurement 
as in their work nor each of the five variables individually have a moderating effect with the 
expected sign except for the single party government indicator and its interaction with the 
majority status of the government. Thus, the choice of the clarity of responsibility measurement I 
employ among the five is empirically motivated.  
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Third, scholars have also studied the heterogeneity across economic contexts. One line of 
research argues that voters in less developed countries place a stronger weight on economic 
conditions when making voting decisions. Brender and Drazen (2008) find that the positive 
relationship between GDP growth and the incumbent’s probability of reelection is observed only 
in developing countries and new democracies, but not in developed countries except for the 
United States. Singer (2011a) further shows that the economy is a more salient consideration for 
voters than other issue dimensions, especially under economic recession, volatility, or 
underdevelopment. Therefore, I expect that the asymmetric effect of economic voting is stronger 
in developing countries than in developed countries (Hypothesis 4).  
Next, I consider how the maturity of a democratic regime conditions the asymmetric 
effects of economic voting. Through the lens of the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, 
economic voting should be stronger in established democracies than new democracies since 
voters of the former may have better information about and more trust in the government, which 
tend to increase economic voting (Duch 2001). In addition, the unstable party systems in new 
democracies may hinder voters’ ability to hold the incumbent party responsible for the economy 
(Gelineau 2007). On the other hand, however, because new democracies tend to be developing 
countries which tend to display stronger patterns of economic voting, as discussed earlier, 
economic performance may be a more important determinant of vote choice in new democracies. 
With this complication in mind, I expect that asymmetric economic voting will be stronger in 
established democracies than new ones (Hypothesis 5).   
 Another stream of research on the heterogeneity in economic voting considers individual-
level factors such as partisanship (Kayser & Wlezien 2011), income (Palmer & Whitten 2011), 
assets (Lewis-Beck & Nadeau 2011), employment status (Grafstein 2005; Hellwig 2001; Jordahl 
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2006), and sophistication (Hobolt et al. 2013; Gomez & Wilson 2001, 2003, 2006). Among 
these, partisanship is the most important factor given its endogenous relationship to voters’ 
assessment of economic conditions as well as its moderating effect.  
Studies have suggested that the relationship between voters’ economic perceptions and 
vote choices is endogenous; voters’ subjective economic assessments are in the middle of the 
causal path from an objective economic condition to their vote choices, and their assessments are 
largely biased by their partisan preferences (Anderseon et al. 2004; Evans & Pickup 2010; 
Johnston et al. 2005; Wilcox and Wlezien 1996; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997; Tilley & 
Hobolt 2011). However, other works that account for this endogeneity still recover a causal 
effect of economic perceptions on voting (Hansford & Gomez 2015; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; 
Tilley et al. 2008).  
Building upon the existing findings of partisan bias in economic perceptions, whereby in-
partisans perceive the economy more positively than out-partisans, I argue that out-partisans 
punish the incumbent more strongly than in-partisans when the economy is weak, but that in-
partisans confer greater rewards on the incumbent than out-partisans when the economy is 
strong. . Thus, I expect to find stronger evidence of asymmetric economic voting among out-
partisans than among in-partisans (Hypothesis 6). Further, consistent with Kayser and Wlezien 
(2011), I expect that independents free from partisan bias display symmetry in their economic 
voting behavior, such that the rewards and punishments they offer the incumbent for good and 
poor economic performance are of similar magnitude. 
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2. Data 
This study utilizes all currently available modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems survey: Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4. For a fair comparison across electoral cases, it includes 
only the most important elections as defined by Tucker (2006) - presidential elections in 
presidential and semi-presidential systems in which the president is endowed with more power, 
and parliamentary elections in parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems in which more 
power is given to the parliament – because economic voting may not function in the same way in 
elections of varying importance (see Appendix A for further explanations on the case selection). 
With this case selection criterion, the data includes 122 elections in 42 countries from 1996 to 
2016 with 145,798 respondents. It is important to note that the data is cross-sectional, as opposed 
to panel, in nature, so that the set of respondents interviewed in each election study varies.5  
Vote Choice (Dependent Variable) 
The dependent variable is the binary vote choice of individual respondents: 1 if a respondent 
voted for the incumbent chief executive, a candidate of his or her party, or the party itself, and 0 
otherwise. If the incumbent chief executive’s party was part of a coalition, only the votes cast for 
the candidate of his or her party or the party itself were coded as 1. The party of the incumbent 
                                                          
5 Nannestad and Paldam (1997, 87) in their study of a grievance asymmetry argue that this very 
concept has to be analyzed on individual-level data with a time-series feature rather than cross-
sectional data because the latter does not have good or bad economic conditions to be compared 
with for each polity. However, in order to test whether the asymmetry is a general phenomenon 
found in most of the representative democracies and to find context-level conditional effects that 
vary across elections, it is inevitable to choose cross-sectional data.  
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chief executive was determined based on the EXECME variable in the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) 2015. For the cases unavailable in the dataset, I followed the DPI’s coding 
rule. Throughout the paper, I refer to this variable voting for the incumbent.6 
Macro-economic indicator 
To measure economic conditions, I use the annual GDP growth rate, inflation rate and 
unemployment rate.7 Following the practice by Hellwig and Samuels (2007b), I use these 
indicators measured in the year before the election (𝑡 − 1) for the elections held in the first six 
                                                          
6 In order to address coalition governments, I constructed another vote choice variable that takes 
1 if a respondent voted for the incumbent chief executive, a candidate of his or her party, his or 
her party itself, candidates of any of the government parties, or any of the government parties as 
defined in the DPI dataset, and 0 otherwise. Following the suggestion of the DPI coding rule, for 
pure presidential systems only the votes cast for the incumbent, a candidate of his or her party, or 
the party itself was coded as 1. Using this as a dependent variable, the major findings are 
consistent with those presented in this paper: no evidence of asymmetric economic voting is 
found using any of the four economic variables. 
7 Although the third and fourth modules of the CSES data include these macroeconomic 
indicators collected from the World Bank, each module varies in the baseline year used to 
compute GDP growth rate and inflation rate because the World Bank updates these measures 
annually using a new baseline year. Thus, to have consistent measures across modules, I 
retrieved the data for all of the cases covered in this analysis in September 2017 from the World 
Bank. For the cases with missing values in unemployment rate, I searched and filled them 
independently. 
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months of a calendar year and use the data from the election year for those held in the latter half 
of the year. For example, the economic performance measured in 𝑡 − 1 may not reflect the 
current state of the economy voters who vote in an election held in November. This 
operationalization of the economic indicators ensures that the economic conditions as described 
in the data accurately reflect those present in the run-up to the election. 
In the literature on asymmetric economic voting, there are two traditions in setting the 
thresholds that are used to determine whether economic conditions are “good” or “bad”: 
economic conditions at the time of the incumbent’s inauguration (Mueller 1970) and economic 
conditions in the year prior to the election (Bloom & Price 1975, Stanig 2013).8 I use the latter 
for the following reasons.  
First, given that the dataset includes various types of elections in many countries, the time 
which elapses between elections varies widely across countriesThus, Mueller’s approach is 
inappropriate for the current study.  
Second, the assumption that voters vote on current economic conditions compared to 
those in the previous year(s) is based on Jordan (1965)’s psychological approach: Voters sense 
that the economy is bad (good) when it is worse (better) as compared to their experience in the 
prior year rather than comparing it to a fixed baseline. The strength of this approach is that the 
baseline is less arbitrary. Therefore, I set the baseline as the economic performance in the second 
                                                          
8 See Nannestad and Paldam (1997) for more discussion. Also note that Mueller (1970) tests the 
effect of economic conditions on the incumbent’s approval rate and Stanig (2013) on economic 
perceptions, not on voting for the incumbent. 
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year preceding the election year (𝑡 − 2) for the elections held in the first half of the year and the 
year before the election year (𝑡 − 1) for those held in the latter half. When the baseline GDP 
growth rate is lower (higher) than the election-proximate growth rate, or the inflation or 
unemployment rates are higher (lower) than the election-proximate rates, then the election-
proximate economy is deemed to be “good” (“bad”).  
Economic Perception 
Individual respondents’ subjective evaluations of economic conditions are also used to test the 
asymmetry hypothesis. The variable used to measure these subjective evaluations is included 
only in Modules 1 and 4. The wording of the relevant survey question is as follows: “Would you 
say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in [country] has gotten better, 
stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” Thus, the variable is measured on a 3-point scale: 3 for 
the responses saying “gotten better”, 2 for “stayed the same” and 1 for “gotten worse.” 
Control Variables 
Individual-level controls include a set of demographic variables typically used to study voting 
behavior: a binary variable for respondents’ partisan affiliation with the party of the incumbent 
chief executive, household income on a 5-point scale as originally coded in the CSES dataset 
(e.g. 5 for the top quintile and 1 for the bottom quintile), the level of education attainment on an 
8-point scale, age on a 5-point scale (1 for below 30 and 5 for 60 or above), and a binary 
indicator for gender (1 for female and 0 for male).  
In a comparative analysis including multiple countries with the vote for the incumbent 
party as a dependent variable, it is not clear how these demographic features are related to voting 
for the incumbent party in each electoral context. Thus, it will be ideal to allow coefficients for 
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each of these variables to vary across elections. However, fitting a multi-level model with a 
random slope for one of these demographic variables took indefinite time for this large dataset.9  
As a solution, I fit a logit model of voting for the incumbent on these five demographic variables 
for each election and found that income and education have relatively heterogeneous effects 
while the age group indicators and the female variable did not.10 Thus, I create a three-labeled 
categorical variable indicating elections in which income had a positive, negative, or null effect, 
and do the same for education. Then, in the final model of the analysis, I interact each of the 
income and education variables with its corresponding indicator of the directions of effect. This 
allows the model to avoid blindly assuming all demographic variables to have the same effect on 
voting for the incumbent across different electoral contexts.  
I also include five context-level variables. First, the vote share of the incumbent or of his 
or her party in the previous election is included as a control variable to account for variations in 
the dependent variable. The following four variables capture any election-level variations that 
may potentially moderate the strength and pattern of economic voting as suggested in previous 
                                                          
9 Both Stata and R failed to fit the model over a week. Even if it was successfully fit after a few 
more days, it is infeasible and inefficient to fit all the models presented in this paper with random 
slopes for each of the demographic variables. 
10 Among the statistically significant coefficients, income had positive coefficients in 39 
elections and negative in 22. The split for education was 29 vs. 35. It was 18 vs. 0 for the age 
group below 30; 23 vs. 3 for those in 30s; 27 vs. 6 for those in 40s; 30 vs. 13 for those in 50s; 31 
vs. 17 for those 60 or older. It was 40 vs. 7 for the female indicator. I present coefficient plots for 
income, education and female variables in the Appendix C. 
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literature: 1) a developing country indicator coded as 1 if a country is not classified as a high-
income country by the World Bank based on its GNI per capita in the election year, and 0 for a 
high-income country; 2) the level of democratic stability coded as 1 for countries in which 
democracy has been maintained for over 30 years and 0 otherwise based on the DEMOC and 
DURABLE variables in Polity IV data set; 3) the system type coded as 1 for presidential or 
semi-presidential systems and 0 for parliamentary or semi-parliamentary systems based on the 
‘lpol_sys’ variable in the Comparative Political Data Set III which followed the categorization 
by Lijphart (1999); 4) the government type coded as 2 for a single-party majority government, 1 
for a single-party minority government or a multiparty majority government, and 0 for a 
multiparty minority government.11 These variables are mainly used to test their moderating 
effects. 
 
3. Model 
Given the three-level hierarchical structure of the data, it is reasonable to take a multilevel 
approach by including random effects for countries and elections respectively.12 However, 
                                                          
11 To identify single-party governments, the gov_type variable of the CPDS III is used. However, 
note that all presidential systems are coded as having a single-party government.  
12 Previous literature using the CSES data has also used a multilevel modeling approach by 
adding election random effects (DeVries & Giger (2014) and Singer (2011b). Note that they only 
used the Module 2 of the CSES data so that each country had only one election, which allowed 
their data structure to be two-level instead of three. 
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studies on multilevel models argue that for estimates of such models to be unbiased, the number 
of groups within each level should be at least 30 for logit models (Bryan and Jenkins 2015, p.19). 
13  Using Monte Carlo simulation, scholars find that if the number of groups is small, the 
coefficients of fixed effects are unbiased but group effects and standard errors of both group 
effects and fixed effects are biased downwards (Bell et al. 2014; Bryan and Jenkins 2015; Mass 
and Hox 2004, 2005; Stegmueller 2013).  In my data, there are enough number of countries to 
include country-level random effects, but the number of elections per country is too small 
varying from one to four elections to identify election-level variance components within a 
country. Therefore, it is undesirable to include random effects for both levels with the election-
level variance nested within the country-level.  
However, clustered variance should be accounted for at both levels. Thus, I choose to 
include random effects for one level and fixed effects for the other. According to Bryan and 
Jenkins (2016) and Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016), one should include random effects 
for all the levels at which other independent variables are measured. Since the key independent 
                                                          
13 Bryan and Jenkins (2015, 7) also state that most multilevel modeling textbooks recommend 
“anywhere between 10 and 50 groups as a minimum” as a rule of thumb depending on research 
design. The authors suggest that Bayesian multilevel modeling performs better for the data with 
small number of groups. Austin (2010) after comparing various multilevel estimation software 
and packages provides evidence for the claim but concludes that any statistical procedures tend 
to poorly estimate variance components when there were only five observations per cluster. 
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variables beyond micro-level features are measured at the election-level, not at the country-level, 
I include election random effects and country fixed effects instead of the other way around.14  
Below presents the basic multilevel logit model using any of the three macro-economic 
indicators without conditional effects taken into account:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 {𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1|  · }
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝐺 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽𝐼 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛 ∗ 𝑍𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘
𝑚+𝑛+𝑘−1
𝑘=𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑚+𝑛
𝑛=𝑚+1
+ 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝜂𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂
2) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜀𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2)  
Here, for individual i in election j of country k, 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the vector of individual level 
control variables, 𝑍𝑗 is a vector of election-level variables, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 is the country indicator, 𝜂𝑗 
is the election random effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the individual level error term. If asymmetric economic 
voting exists, the coefficient on the interaction term between macro-economic indicator (Econ) 
and the good economy indicator (Good), 𝛽𝐼, is expected to be negative and significant, and the 
marginal effect of Econ when the economy is good (Good=1) should be significantly smaller 
than that under a bad economy (Good=0). In this test of the difference in marginal effects of the 
                                                          
14 Stanig (2013), in his study of partisan bias in economic perceptions using a mixture of CSES 
Module 1 and European Social Survey data, employed election fixed effects and country random 
intercepts. However, because including election fixed effects will consume more degrees of 
freedom than including country fixed effects, I use the opposite combination.  
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two situations, the null hypothesis assumes no difference between the two suggesting a 
symmetry.  
Below is the model using individual voter’s perception of the economy instead of any of 
the macro-economic indicators. The perception variable is included as a factor variable with 
“about the same” response as a baseline category. For asymmetric economic voting to exist, the 
coefficient on “got worse” responses, 𝛽𝑊, should be negative and significant, and its absolute 
size should be significantly greater than that on “got better” responses, 𝛽𝐵, such that 𝛽𝑊 + 𝛽𝐵 <
0.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 {𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1|  · }
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑊 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝐵 ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛 ∗ 𝑍𝑗
𝑚+𝑛
𝑛=𝑚+1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘
𝑚+𝑛+𝑘−1
𝑘=𝑚+𝑛+1
+ 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   
 
4. Results 
This section is composed of two parts. First, I present results using macroeconomic indicators in 
the following order: main results, robustness checks, and the analysis of conditional effects of 
context- and individual-level covariates on the asymmetric economic voting pattern. Second, I 
convey results using individual voters’ economic perceptions.  
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4.1. Analysis Using Macroeconomic Indicators 
4.1.1. Main Results 
The first two models in Table 1 presents results using GDP growth rate as a main predictor, with 
voting for the incumbent as a dependent variable. Each model includes election random effects 
and country fixed effects.  
Before testing the asymmetry hypothesis, it is necessary to check whether economic 
voting exists. Thus, the first model tests the classic economic voting hypothesis. The coefficients 
on GDP growth rate is positive and highly significant when controlling for individual-level 
variables and the vote share of the incumbent from the previous election, which confirms that 
economic voting exists.15  
The individual-level control variables include education attainment and income interacted 
with their corresponding indicators for the direction of effects, respectively, and age groups and 
female indicators in single terms. Note that four age-group indicators are omitted from the table 
due to limited space. With voters in their 20s as the baseline group, only those in their 30s have a 
coefficient significant at .05 level, and its sign is positive. Interestingly, females are significantly 
more likely to vote for the incumbent than for the challenger. A possibly relevant explanation 
can be the risk attitudes, introduced by Bowler and Donovan (1998), such that females might be 
more risk-avoidant preferring what they are already familiar with than males. 
                                                          
15 Simpler versions of the Models 1 and 2 only with the economic variables and party affiliation 
are presented in the appendix. 
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Table 1. Models Using the GDP Growth Rate or Economic Perceptions 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Growth .069*** .028   
 (.021) (.026)   
Good Econ  -.259   
  (.216)   
Good Econ*   .113**   
Growth  (.048)   
Economic Perception   .493***  
   (.019)  
Negative Perception    -.516*** 
    (.034) 
Positive Perception    .472*** 
    (.031) 
Party ID 3.720*** 3.720*** 3.747*** 3.747*** 
 (.025) (.025) (.039) (.039) 
Income .011 .011 .021 .021 
 (.008) (.008) (.013) (.013) 
IncomePositive -.478*** -.443*** -1.326*** -1.329*** 
 (.152) (.152) (.211) (.211) 
IncomeNegative .880*** .872*** -1.419*** -1.418*** 
 (.170) (.166) (.265) (.265) 
Income* .167*** .167*** .135*** .136*** 
IncomePositive (.015) (.015) (.022) (.022) 
Income* -.211*** -.210*** -.280*** -.280*** 
IncomeNegative (.015) (.015) (.024) (.024) 
Educ -.034*** -.034*** -.029*** -.028*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.011) (.011) 
EducPositive -1.465*** -1.377*** -1.047*** -1.041*** 
 (.221) (.219) (.221) (.221) 
EducNegative .612*** .608*** .603*** .605*** 
 (.137) (.136) (.142) (.142) 
Educ* .226*** .225*** .155*** .155*** 
EducPositive (.021) (.021) (.026) (.026) 
Educ* -.132*** -.132*** -.139*** -.139*** 
EducNegative (.010) (.010) (.016) (.016) 
Female .101*** .101*** .149*** .148*** 
 (.016) (.016) (.025) (.025) 
Vote share -.005 -.005 -.017* -.017* 
 (.008) (.008) (.010) (.010) 
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -2.564*** -2.714*** -2.751*** -1.758*** 
 (.569) (.559) (.518) (.518) 
Election-level variance .431 
(.029) 
.419 
(.029) 
.193 
(.024) 
.193 
(.024) 
     
Observations 115,507 115,507 48,101 48,101 
N. of elections 120 120 50 50 
The dependent variable is the individual vote choice for the incumbent candidate or party.  
Four age group indicators are omitted due to limited space. 
† The German election in 2002 is divided into two survey data and counted twice.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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The previous vote share of the incumbent may be related to an individual voter’s 
probability to vote for the incumbent. However, two different theoretical explanations are 
possible. Since the incumbent party won the last election, it is reasonable to expect that the 
probability of a random voter in the country voting for the incumbent is relatively high so that a 
positive correlation is expected. On the other hand, when there is a wax, there follows a wane 
such that previous victory may be negatively related to the probability of winning the following 
election, which is similar to the concept of “regression to the mean” in statistics.16 Reflecting 
these opposing expectations, the vote share from the previous election is not statistically 
significant. 
In addition, I further tested if the effect of the GDP growth rate varies depending on the 
stage of economic development, the maturity of a democratic regime, the system type, and the 
government type by adding a two-way interaction term for each of these four contextual 
variables at a time to the third model. However, none of these interaction terms were statistically 
significant suggesting that despite the large variation across contexts in the dataset on these 
dimensions, I can assume that a one percentage change in the GDP growth rate has a similar 
electoral impact across the cases considered here. In addition, this result holds when using 
inflation rate or unemployment rate in place of the GDP growth rate.  
The second model examines the asymmetry hypothesis by including an interaction 
between the GDP growth rate and a binary indicator for a good economy. In order to test the 
hypothesis, I first check if the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. Then, I see 
                                                          
16 Also see Fiorina and Shepsle (1989) studying this pattern using a formal model followed by 
empirical tests. 
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if the marginal effect of economic growth on the probability of voting for the incumbent is 
positive, significant, and larger in a bad economy than it is in a good economy while holding all 
other factors at their means. Then, I conduct a chi-squared test to examine if the difference in the 
marginal effect of a bad economy and that of a good economy is statistically different from zero 
while the former larger than the latter.17 
The interaction term is statistically significant at the .05 level but, surprisingly, runs in 
the opposite direction. That is, its coefficient has a positive sign suggesting that the electoral 
impact of economic growth on the incumbent’s vote gain is greater in a good economy than in a 
bad one. Further analysis on the marginal effect shows that the GDP growth rate in a bad 
economy is positive but small and insignificant while that in a good economy is substantively 
large and significant at the .001 level. The chi-squared test demonstrates that the difference 
between the marginal effects in bad and good economies is statistically significant implying that 
there is a reverse asymmetry. The marginal effects and the test result are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Marginal Effect of Economic Conditions on Pr(Voting for the Incumbent) 
 GDP Growth Inflation Unemployment 
Bad Economy .004 (.003) -.004** (.002) -.009*** (.003) 
Good Economy .019*** (.005) -.003 (.003) -.004 (.004) 
Difference .015** .002 .006 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
                                                          
17 In this article, the difference between any two marginal effects is estimated using ‘mlincom’ 
command in a Stata package called SPost13 by Long and Freese (2014). 
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Now, I consider the asymmetric effects of inflation and unemployment rates. As in Table 
1, the same models were run for both indicators, respectively, each taking the place of the GDP 
growth rate. The regression results are in Appendix C. The economic voting theory predicts that 
their effects on voting for the incumbent will be negative, and the results correspond to the 
prediction. The coefficient on the inflation and unemployment rates under the specification as in 
Model 1 are -.032 (s.e.=.013), and -.064 (.023), respectively. When testing the asymmetry 
hypothesis as in Model 2, the interaction term between the good economy indicator and the 
inflation rate is not significant (.014 (.021)), and that for the unemployment rate is positive and 
only marginally significant at the .1 level (.049 (.028)).  
Table 2 and the plot in the upper-left corner of Figure 1 present the marginal effect of 
each of the economic indicators given that the economy improved or deteriorated from the 
previous year. Interestingly, in contrast with GDP growth, both inflation and unemployment 
affect voters’ choices only in a bad economy, providing an empirical support for the asymmetry 
hypothesis. However, the chi-squared tests suggest that, for both indicators, the difference 
between the marginal effects in good and bad economies are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the asymmetry hypothesis receives little empirical support even when inflation or 
unemployment are considered. 
 [Figure 1. HERE] 
4.1.2. Robustness Checks 
In order to check robustness of the results, I manipulate the data in several ways. First, I drop 
outlier observations where their economic indicator values fall outside of the ±1.5*Interquartile 
range. Given the diversity of countries in the dataset which includes developing countries 
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experiencing dynamic economic fluctuations, there are some significant outliers. For example, 
with regards to the inflation rate that has the median at 2.6% and the upper quartile at 4.1%, in 
Romania, it was 44.1% in 2004 and 25.6% in 1996; in Poland, it was 20% in 1997.  
 Second, some readers may challenge the idea of defining cases that experienced .1% 
increase in the GDP growth rate as good economies and those with .1% decrease as bad since 
such a small change can happen almost at random. To address this concern, I exclude the 
elections in which the economic indicators changed by .5% point or less from the preceding year 
for the GDP growth and inflation rates, and by .25% point or less for the unemployment rate.18 
This serves as a new threshold classifying bad and good economies. 
 Third, instead of conditioning on the election month as Hellwig and Samuels (2007b) 
suggest, I use the economic indicators in the year before the election. Then, a new baseline is 
determined by whether the economic indicator improved from the preceding year, (𝑡 − 2), to the 
year before the election, (𝑡 − 1), or not.  
 The last three graphs in Figure 1 present the marginal effects of the economy employing 
each of these three sets of manipulations for all three economic indicators. These models include 
the full set of control variables as in Model 2. The results are almost identical to the findings in 
                                                          
18 The reason for choosing a different threshold for the unemployment rate is because it was 
relatively more stable than the other two so that a .5% threshold drops almost a half of the 
observations in the dataset. 
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the previous section.19 Therefore, the results are robust across various manipulations to the 
selection of cases and the use of different thresholds determining good and bad economies.  
4.1.3. Tests on Contextual Variations 
Although the preceding analyses find little support for the asymmetry hypothesis asymmetric 
effect of the economic conditions seems largely missing so far, it may be that the asymmetry 
asymmetric economic voting is more prominent in certain countries than others, and these effects 
might have been masked in the pooled analysis of the previous sections. Thus, now I further 
analyze conditional effects of contextual variables on the grievance asymmetry hypothesis. Four 
context-level variations moderators are considered: developing vs. developed countries; 
durability of a democratic regime for over thirty years vs. not; presidential systems vs. 
parliamentary systems; single majority government, multi-party majority or single minority 
government, and multi-party minority government.  
For the test, the three-way interaction among the economic indicator, the binary variable 
for a good economy, and each moderating variable was added to the model along with the two-
way interactions between each of the constituent parts and the constituent parts themselves. The 
analysis includes the full set of control variables as in Model 2. The marginal effect of the 
economic indicator in both good and bad economies under all possible values of the moderator 
variables used in the model are presented in the first nine plots of Figure 2. In addition, I test if 
the gap between the marginal effects is statistically significant between good and bad economic 
                                                          
19 Detailed presentation and discussion of the results are in the appendix. 
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conditions while holding the moderator variable constant. The complete test results are available 
in Appendix C.  
 [ Figure 2. HERE ] 
Consistent with the findings from the previous section, the marginal effect of the GDP 
growth rate is positive and significant only in good economies, but not in bad economies, in most 
of the subgroups of countries except for developing countries, presidential systems, and multi-
party minority governments. However, the difference in marginal effect between good and bad 
economies is not statistically significant in all cases except for parliamentary systems which 
show a reverse asymmetry (Diff. = .021 (p-value = .002)). Therefore, based on GDP growth, 
there is no evidence of asymmetric economic voting in any macro-level subgroups.  
However, the asymmetry hypothesis gains partial support in certain contexts when 
inflation is considered. The marginal effect is negative and significant at .05 level only in bad 
economic conditions in developing countries (-.006 (s.e. = .003)) but not in developed countries 
(-.003 (.003)), in transitional democracies (-.007 (.003)) but not in established democracies 
(-.003 (.002)), in both presidential (-.058 (.014)) and parliamentary (-.004 (.002)) systems, and in 
single-majority governments (-.060 (.019)). However, the gap between marginal effects in bad 
and good economies is significantly different from zero only in presidential systems (Diff. = .052 
(p-value = .000)) and in single-majority governments (Diff. = .053 (p-value = .008) providing 
support for the asymmetry hypothesis.  
 Similar to the inflation rate, voting patterns in some situations demonstrate asymmetric 
economic voting when considering the unemployment rate as the macroeconomic indicator of 
interest. The marginal effect of the unemployment rate is negative and significant only when it 
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increases from the previous year in both developing (-.014 (.006)) and developed countries 
(-.009 (.004)), in transitional democracies (-.012 (.005)), in parliamentary systems (-.012 (.003)), 
and in single-minority or multi-party majority governments (-.015 (.004)). However, the 
difference in marginal effects between good and bad economic conditions is statistically 
significant only in developed countries (Diff. = .011 (p-value = .042)), transitional democracies 
(Diff. = 0.12 (p-value = .026)) and single-minority or multi-party majority governments (Diff. 
= .013 (p-value = .004)). Therefore, the asymmetry hypothesis is supported in these three types 
of systems.  
4.1.4. Tests on Individual-level Variations 
Asymmetric economic voting may be stronger among certain subpopulations that are defined not 
just by context-level features, but also by individual characteristics such as partisanship. This 
section tests the moderating effect of voters’ partisan affiliation with respect to the incumbent 
party.  
The last two plots in Figure 2 present the results. First, the marginal effect of GDP 
growth is positive and significant only in good economies for both in- and out- partisans. The 
difference is slightly larger among out-partisans (Diff. = .018 (p-value = .015)) than in-partisans 
(.010 (.033)), but both provide support for a reverse asymmetric effect where voters reward 
incumbents more for positive economic conditions than they punish them for negative economic 
conditions. Second, inflation has a negative and significant effect on voting for the incumbent 
only in bad economies among both in- and out-partisans. However, unexpectedly, the difference 
between bad and good economic conditions is statistically significant only among in-partisans 
(.005 (.019)). Third, the negative and significant marginal effect of unemployment is found only 
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in a bad economy among out-partisans but not among in-partisans, and the difference between 
good and bad economies is statistically significant only among out-partisans (.010 (.023)), which 
is consistent with the expectation. 
Analyzing both context- and individual-level conditional effects, we learned that 
asymmetric economic voting manifests in certain contexts and among certain populations when 
using unemployment or inflation, but not GDP growth, to measure macroeconomic conditions. 
This finding contributes to overall mixed results in the literature but enlightens us with a more 
detailed, thorough illustration of when and among whom the asymmetry hypothesis holds and 
does not hold for which economic indicators. Moreover, the results also help us better understand 
why previous literature found inconsistent results by studying one or a handful of countries using 
different economic indicators. 
4.2. Analysis Using Voters’ Economic Perceptions 
In order to avoid the endogeneity problem that voters’ self-assessments of the economy have, I 
mainly used objective economic indicators for the study in the preceding sections. However, I 
additionally conduct the same analysis using the former as another line of robustness checks 
these subjective self-assessments so as to provide an additional robustness check for my findings. 
This is to approach addresses an argument that using subjective measures of economic 
conditions the former is theoretically more appropriate since the economic voting theory assumes 
that voters vote based on the economy that they “can and do” observe even though the “observed 
economy” contains variations varies across individuals (Stevenson and Duch 2013). As I noted 
earlier, I acknowledge that the model using economic perceptions may suffer from endogeneity 
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even after controlling for the partisan affiliation with the incumbent without employing a causal 
inference model that statistically breaks the reciprocal causal relationship.  
In Table 1, the third model indicates that voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent 
when they have more positive economic perceptions, as the coefficient on voters’ economic 
perception is positive and highly significant.  
The fourth model tests the asymmetry hypothesis by treating the perception variable as 
categorical with the “stayed the same” response as a baseline category. If the hypothesis is 
supported, the coefficient on the indicator for those who responded “gotten worse” should be 
statistically significant and greater in its absolute value than that on the indicator for those who 
said “gotten better.” The result shows that both coefficients are statistically significant in the 
theoretically expected direction. Interestingly, the coefficient on the “gotten worse” responses is 
slightly larger in magnitude (-.516 (s.e.=.034)) than the one on the “gotten better” responses 
(.472 (.031)) suggesting that voters respond more strongly to a worsening economy than they do 
to an improving one. However, the chi-squared test fails to reject the null that their absolute 
values are not statistically different from each other (p-value: .404), implying that voters respond 
almost symmetrically to both improving and worsening economies.  
Next, I further investigate the moderating effects of contextual variation as well as 
individual voters’ partisan affiliations. The model specification is as follows. For example, to test 
whether asymmetric economic voting varies between developing and non-developing countries, I 
include a developing country indicator and two interaction terms: Developing*Negative 
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Perception and Developing*Positive Perception.20 Then, I calculate the marginal effects of 
positive and negative economic perceptions in developing and developed countries, respectively. 
All four marginal effects are statistically significant with the theoretically expected signs. In 
developed countries, positive economic perceptions have the marginal effect of .071 (.006) on 
voting for the incumbent while negative perceptions have the effect of -.074 (.006), suggesting 
that the effects are almost symmetric in size. In developing countries, the marginal effect of 
negative perceptions is slightly larger in size (-.071 (.006)) than that of negative perceptions 
(.065 (.009)). However, in both types of countries, the gap in their absolute values is not 
statistically significant (p-values: .754 in developed countries and .187 in developing 
countries).21  
Similarly, the asymmetry hypothesis is not supported in any types of contexts compared: 
established (p-value: .269) vs. transitional (.949) democracies, presidential (.983) vs. 
                                                          
20 This model and the one testing the moderating effect of the party affiliation are included in the 
appendix to present the model specifications. 
21 Unlike the models using macro-economic indicators, I can fit a model using economic 
perceptions for each of the individual election studies. The Figure A4 in the appendix provides 
the size of the asymmetric economic voting effect, which is simply the summation of coefficients 
on “gotten worse” responses “gotten better” responses, with 95% CIs for each election survey. 
Five surveys have negative and significant estimates suggesting an asymmetric effect, and three 
surveys show a reverse asymmetric effect. These cases are labeled with the country’s initials and 
the year of the election. Still, it is hard to find any systematic pattern when asymmetric effects 
appear. 
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parliamentary (.555) systems, and single-party majority governments (.208) vs. multi-party 
majority governments or single-party minority governments (.734) vs. multi-party minority 
government (.421).22  
To test if voters’ electoral reactions to positively and negatively perceived economic 
conditions are asymmetric among in-partisans and out-partisans, respectively, the model also 
includes interactions between the economic perception variables and the in-partisan indicator. 
Among out-partisans, a reverse asymmetric effect is found: the marginal effect of positive 
economic perception (.086 (.006)) is larger in absolute size than that of the negative economic 
perception (-.070 (.005)), but the difference in size is not statistically significant (p-value: .059). 
Among in-partisans, the marginal effects of both positive and negative perceptions are relatively 
small (.023 (.006) and -.042 (.009)), implying that in-partisans’ support for the incumbent 
depends less on the economic fluctuations compared to that of out-partisans. Although in-
partisans seem to show the pattern of asymmetric economic voting, the difference in the size of 
these marginal effects is not significant (p-value: .145). 
When in- and out-partisans are compared vis-à-vis, out-partisans punish the incumbent 
more severely for a bad economy than do in-partisans, and they also confer greater rewards on 
him. This may be due to the way out-partisans are coded in this analysis such that they include 
                                                          
22 When testing the conditional effect of the durability of democracy and the system types, Stata 
failed to estimate marginal effects of economic perceptions in the pooled model with the three-
way interaction terms. Thus, for these two cases, the analyses were conducted on the subset of 
data for each system separately. 
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non-partisan independents who are more likely to display economic voting behavior (Kayser and 
Wlezien 2011).  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper makes three important contributions to the literature on economic voting. First, it is a 
comprehensive study of the asymmetry hypothesis in terms of the scale of data it analyzes, the 
diversity of measurements of economic conditions, and the testing of moderating effects of 
contextual and individual level factors.  
Second and most importantly, it finds little support for the asymmetry hypothesis. Given 
the mixed results from prior studies of one or several selected countries, this finding based on 
122 election surveys in 42 countries suggests that asymmetric economic voting is not a general 
trend. Rather, the effects of positive and negative inflation rates, unemployment rates, and 
subjective economic perceptions are roughly symmetric in size. Moreover, GDP growth 
manifested a reverse asymmetric effect which is counter-intuitive and calls for further 
investigation in future studies. One possible explanation for the inconsistent findings across 
economic indicators may be that inflation and unemployment rates capture the economic 
conditions that are more directly and acutely felt by voters than GDP growth does, or that 
governments can find leeway to avoid blame for sluggish growth more easily than for high 
inflation or unemployment rates. Disentangling these inconsistent effects is beyond the scope of 
this paper and certainly casts an interesting question to be answered in the future.     
Third, it is the first study to investigate the contextual- and individual-level heterogeneity 
of asymmetric economic voting behavior. Despite the overall null finding for the asymmetry 
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hypothesis, the analysis across subpopulations reveals some supportive evidence that was 
masked in the pooled analysis. The effect of inflation was asymmetric in presidential systems 
and single-majority governments. When unemployment is considered, asymmetric economic 
voting was found in developed countries, transitional democracies, and single-majority or 
multiparty majority governments. However, the three economic indicators disagreed on which of 
the out-partisans and in-partisans show a greater asymmetric effect. 
This set of heterogeneous evidence among subpopulations is interesting but rather noisy. 
First, these findings imply that the asymmetry hypothesis may not be a complete myth, but rather 
that asymmetric economic voting behavior may exist in some situations. Second, however, the 
moderating effects of each of the context-level variables and voters’ partisan affiliation vary 
greatly by economic indicators without any consistent patterns. Therefore, I conclude that the 
results provide interesting information on when and among whom the economic performance 
induces asymmetric economic voting behavior, but this evidence is not consistent enough to call 
for a change to the linearity assumption of economic voting models.  
The null finding for asymmetric economic voting behavior suggests that although we 
know that economic stability is politically important (Quinn & Woolley 2001) and that there is 
cost of ruling (Paldam and Skott 1995), the asymmetry hypothesis may not provide an 
explanation for these phenomena, which contradicts the implications that Nannestad and Paldam 
(1997) draw. It further casts  doubt on the generality of the negativity effect and calls for a more 
extensive test in other areas such as attitude formation, electoral campaigns and media effects. 
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Appendix A. 
This section explains the rules of case selection: 1) Elections with electoral fraud or with a polity 
score below 7 in the year of election are dropped (Belarus, Mexico in 1997, Peru in 2000 and 
2001, Russia, Thailand; Hong Kong does not have a polity score) because I assume that the 
accountability mechanism through elections is unlikely to function properly in these countries. 2) 
Elections where no incumbent or incumbent party is running are dropped (Czech Republic 2013, 
Lithuania 1997, Latvia 2010, Kenya 2013, Kyrgyzstan 2005, Romania 2012, and Ukraine 1998). 
3) Switzerland is the only country with a hybrid system in the dataset. Since its chief executives 
are elected citizens, not politicians with party affiliations, the incumbent party cannot be defined. 
Thus, Switzerland is not included in the analysis.  
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Table A1. List of Cases Included in the Analysis (42 countries and 122 elections) 
Country Elections Country Elections 
Albania 2005 Japan 1996, 2004, 2007 
Australia 1996, 2004, 2007, 2013 Mexico 2000, 2006, 2012 
Austria 2008, 2013 Montenegro 2012 
Belgium 1999†, 2003 Netherlands 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
Bulgaria 2001, 2014 New Zealand 1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 
2014 
Brazil 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 Norway 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 
2013 
Canada 1997, 2004, 2008, 2011 Philippines 2004, 2010, 2016 
Croatia 2007 Poland 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 
2011 
Chile 1999, 2005, 2009 Portugal 2002, 2005, 2009, 2015 
Czech Republic 1996, 2002, 2006, 2010 Romania 1996, 2004 
Denmark 1998, 2001, 2007 Serbia 2012 
Estonia 2011 South Africa 2009, 2014 
Finland 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 Slovakia 2010, 2016 
France 2002, 2012 Slovenia 2004, 2008, 2011 
Germany 1998, 2002*, 2005, 2009, 
2013 
Spain 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 
Greece 2009 Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006, 2014 
Hungary 1998, 2002  Taiwan  1996, 2004, 2012 
Iceland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 
2013 
Turkey 2011, 2015 
Ireland 2002, 2007, 2011 United Kingdom: 
Great Britain 
1997, 2005, 2015 
Israel 1996, 2003, 2006, 2013 United States 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012 
Italy 2006 Uruguay 2009 
† Originally divided into two groups but only the surveys in Flanders are used due to missing values of the Party ID in Walloon.  
* This election has two separate surveys - one administered through telephone calls and the other via mail-back method – and 
thus counted as two election studies in the statistical models. 
 
Appendix B. Codebook 
Vote for the incumbent: Respondent’s vote choice in electing a chief executive. (1) voted for the 
incumbent, a candidate from his or her party, or his or her party itself, (0) otherwise. (In most 
election studies, there are more than one variable of vote choices. Thus, in countries with run-off 
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systems for presidential elections, only the votes cast in the first round are used (e.g. France in 
2002, Romania in 2004 and etc.). In parliamentary elections, the lower house elections instead of 
the upper house (e.g. Philippines in 2002) and votes for party lists instead of district candidates 
are used if both are available.) 
Vote share: The incumbent’s vote share in the previous election of the same type and coded in 
percentages. 
Party ID: Partisan inclination of the respondent. (0) opposition parties, (1) incumbent party.  
Income: Total household income. (0) lowest income quintile, (1) second income quintile, (2) 
third income quintile, (3) income quintile, (4) highest income quintile. 
Education: The level of education attainment. (0) none, (1) incomplete primary, (2) primary 
completed, (3) incomplete secondary, (4) secondary completed, (5) post-secondary 
trade/vocational school, (6) incomplete undergraduate, (7) complete university. 
Age: (1) Below 30, (2) 30-39, (3) 40-49, (4) 50-59, (5) 60 or above.  
Female: Gender of the respondent. (1) female, (0) male. 
Developing: (1) developing country, (0) developed country. 
Durable: (1) democracy lasted for 30 years or more, (0) democracy lasted for less than 30 years. 
Presidential: (1) (semi-) presidential systems, (0) (semi-) parliamentary systems. 
Single-majority: (2) single-party majority government, (1) single-party minority or multi-party 
majority government, (0) multi-party minority government. 
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Appendix C. Additional Results 
[ Figure A1. HERE ] 
[ Figure A2. HERE ] 
[ Figure A3. HERE ]  
[ Figure A4. HERE ]  
Table A2. Simpler Models Using the GDP Growth Rate 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
Growth .081*** .032 
 (.020) (.026) 
Good Econ  -.187 
  (.199) 
Good Econ*   .111** 
Growth  (.047) 
Party ID 3.703*** 3.703*** 
 (.022) (.022) 
Country Indicators Yes Yes 
   
Constant -2.928*** -3.101*** 
 (.471) (.459) 
Election-level 
variance 
.442 
(.029) 
.426 
(.028) 
   
Observations 145,798 145,798 
N. of elections 123† 123† 
The dependent variable is the individual vote choice for the incumbent candidate or party.  
† The German election in 2002 is divided into two survey data and counted twice.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table A3. Models Using the Inflation Rate 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Inflation Rate -.023 -.032** -.025* -.033** 
 (.013) (.013) (.014) (.013) 
Good Econ   -.008 -.025 
   (.141) (.147) 
Good Econ*    .014 .014 
Inflation Rate   (.021) (.021) 
Party ID 3.708*** 3.725*** 3.703*** 3.719*** 
 (.022) (.025) (.022) (.025) 
Income  .012  .012 
  (.008)  (.008) 
IncomePositive  -.314***  -.339** 
  (.159)  (.163) 
IncomeNegative  .938***  .943*** 
  (.173)  (.174) 
Income*  .167***  .167*** 
IncomePositive  (.015)  (.015) 
Income*  -.211***  -.210*** 
IncomeNegative  (.015)  (.015) 
Educ  -.034***  -.035*** 
  (.007)  (.007) 
EducPositive  -1.381***  -1.403*** 
  (.207)  (.215) 
EducNegative  .649***  .634*** 
  (.140)  (.141) 
Educ*  .208***  .208*** 
EducPositive  (.018)  (.018) 
Educ*  -.132***  -.131*** 
EducNegative  (.010)  (.011) 
Female  .105***  .105*** 
  (.016)  (.016) 
Vote share  -.005  -.003 
  (.008)  (.009) 
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -2.408*** -2.103*** -2.401*** -2.137*** 
 (.477) (.573) (.477) (.582) 
Election-level 
variance 
.463 
(.030) 
.442 
(.030) 
.462 
(.031) 
.443 
(.030) 
     
Observations 147,217 116,692 145,812 115,545 
N. of elections 124† 121 123† 120 
The dependent variable is the individual vote choice for the incumbent candidate or party.  
Four age group variables are omitted due to limited space. 
† The German election in 2002 is divided into two survey data and counted twice. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table A4. Models Using the Unemployment Rate (%) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Unemployment % -.074*** -.064*** -.091*** -.074*** 
 (.023) (.023) (.025) (.025) 
Good Econ   -.042 .080 
   (.210) (.210) 
Good Econ*    .066** .049* 
Unemployment %   (.028) (.028) 
Party ID 3.689*** 3.703*** 3.758*** 3.778*** 
 (.023) (.026) (.024) (.027) 
Income  .013  .009 
  (.009)  (.009) 
IncomePositive  -.477***  -.621*** 
  (.160)  (.148) 
IncomeNegative  .773***  .643*** 
  (.185)  (.171) 
Income*  .156***  .161*** 
IncomePositive  (.016)  (.016) 
Income*  -.210***  -.207*** 
IncomeNegative  (.015)  (.016) 
Educ  -.031***  -.035*** 
  (.007)  (.007) 
EducPositive  -1.559***  -1.557*** 
  (.243)  (.227) 
EducNegative  .744***  .649*** 
  (.146)  (.135) 
Educ*  .201***  .205*** 
EducPositive  (.020)  (.021) 
Educ*  -.134***  -.131*** 
EducNegative  (.011)  (.011) 
Female  .094***  .091*** 
  (.017)  (.017) 
Vote share  -.003  -.003 
  (.009)  (.008) 
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -1.529*** -1.314** -1.823*** -1.728*** 
 (.304) (.527) (.307) (.501) 
Election-level 
variance 
.461 
(.032) 
.437 
(.031) 
.401 
(.028) 
.390 
(.028) 
     
Observations 133,091 105,366 131,241 103,754 
N. of elections 112 109 111 108 
The dependent variable is the individual vote choice for the incumbent candidate or party.  
Four age group variables are omitted due to limited space. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table A5. Models Using Individual Economic Perceptions to Test Conditional Effects 
Variables Model 9 Model 10 
   
Economic Perception   
   
Negative Perception -.552*** -.538*** 
 (.041) (.036) 
Positive Perception .460*** .509*** 
 (.035) (.033) 
Developing -.699***  
 (.200)  
Negative*Developing .102  
 (.072)  
Positive* Developing .050  
 (.073)  
Negative* Party ID  .140 
  (.092) 
Positive* PartyID  -.232*** 
  (.083) 
Party ID 3.748*** 3.786*** 
 (.039) (.057) 
Income .021 .021 
 (.013) (.013) 
IncomePositive -1.230*** -1.339*** 
 (.194) (.211) 
IncomeNegative 1.348*** -1.409*** 
 (.237) (.265) 
Income* .134*** .134*** 
IncomePositive (.022) (.022) 
Income* -.281*** -.281*** 
IncomeNegative (.024) (.024) 
Educ -.030*** -.028** 
 (.011) (.011) 
EducPositive -1.149*** -1.036*** 
 (.208) (.222) 
EducNegative .706*** .609*** 
 (.135) (.142) 
Educ* .154*** .154*** 
EducPositive (.026) (.026) 
Educ* -.138*** -.140*** 
EducNegative (.016) (.016) 
Female .149*** .147*** 
 (.025) (.025) 
Vote share -.033*** -.018* 
 (.010) (.010) 
Country Indicators Yes Yes 
   
Constant -.943* -1.738*** 
 (.519) (.518) 
Election-level variance .166 
(.023) 
.193 
(.024) 
   
Observations 48,101 48,101 
N. of elections 50 50 
The dependent variable is the individual vote choice for the incumbent candidate or party.  
Four age group variables are omitted due to limited space. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table A6. Contextual Variations in the Marginal Effects of the GDP Growth Rate 
 Established 
Democracies 
Parliamentary 
Systems 
Single-Majority 
Goverments 
Developed 
Countries 
Bad Economy .002 (.005) .002 (.004) .005 (.007) .004 (.004) 
Good Economy .019** (.009) .023*** (.006) .032** (.016) .022** (.009) 
Difference .017* .021*** .005 .018*  
 Transitional 
Democracies 
Presidential 
Systems 
Single-Minority 
or Multi-party 
Majority Gov. 
Developing 
Countries 
Bad Economy .006 (.005) .013 (.009) .009* (.005) .011 (.009) 
Good Economy .024*** (.008) .002 (.019) .024*** (.007) .016 (.010) 
Difference .018* -.011 .015* .005 
   Multi-party 
Minority Gov. 
 
Bad Economy   .001 (.006)  
Good Economy   -.043 (.033)  
Difference   -.044  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
Table A7. Contextual Variations in the Marginal Effects of the Inflation Rate 
 Established 
Democracies 
Parliamentary 
Systems 
Single-Majority 
Goverments 
Developed 
Countries 
Bad Economy -.003 (.002) -.004** (.002) -.060*** (.019) -.003 (.003) 
Good Economy -.005 (.006) -.003 (.003) -.007 (.007) -.002 (.006) 
Difference -.002 .001 .053*** .001  
 Transitional 
Democracies 
Presidential 
Systems 
Single-Minority 
or Multi-party 
Majority Gov. 
Developing 
Countries 
Bad Economy -.007** (.003) -.058*** (.014) .002 (.005) -.006** (.003) 
Good Economy .001 (.004) -.006 (.008) .000 (.003) -.003 (.005) 
Difference .007* .052*** .002 .003 
   Multi-party 
Minority Gov. 
 
Bad Economy   -.002 (.002)  
Good Economy   -.005 (.008)  
Difference   -.003  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table A8. Contextual Variations in the Marginal Effects of the Unemployment Rate 
 Established 
Democracies 
Parliamentary 
Systems 
Single-Majority 
Goverments 
Developed 
Countries 
Bad Economy -.014*** (.005) -.012*** (.003) -.010 (.007) -.009** (.004) 
Good Economy -.014** (.007) -.006* (.003) .002 (.012) .001 (.004) 
Difference -.001 .007* .012 .011**  
 Transitional 
Democracies 
Presidential 
Systems 
Single-Minority 
or Multi-party 
Majority Gov. 
Developing 
Countries 
Bad Economy -.012** (.005) .015 (.016) -.015*** (.004) -.014** (.006) 
Good Economy -.000 (.004) .058*** (.018) -.002 (.004) -.013* (.007) 
Difference .012** .043*** .013*** .001 
   Multi-party 
Minority Gov. 
 
Bad Economy   -.004 (.009)  
Good Economy   -.000 (.012)  
Difference   .004  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table A9. Robustness Checks on the Marginal Effects of Economic Conditions 
 w/o outliers w/o middle cases Ignoring election 
month 
  GDP growth rate  
Bad Economy .004 (.005) .003 (.004) .004 (.005) 
Good Economy .019*** (.006) .022*** (.006) .013** (.006) 
Difference .015** .019*** .008 
 Inflation rate 
Bad Economy -.010** (.005) -.006*** (.002) -.003 (.002) 
Good Economy .000 (.004) -.006 (.003) -.003 (.002) 
Difference .010* .001 .001 
 Unemployment rate 
Bad Economy -.010*** (.003) -.010*** (.003) -.001 (.003) 
Good Economy -.007 (.004) -.010** (.004) -.014*** (.004) 
Difference .003 .000 -.012*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
For the GDP growth rate, voters vote on it only in a good economic condition, and the 
difference in marginal effects between good and bad economies is statistically significant at .01 
level when outliers or the cases in the middle range of economic improvements are dropped. 
43 
 
However, the difference is insignificant when the growth rate in the year before the election is 
used regardless of the election month.  
For the inflation and unemployment rates, in some models their marginal effects are 
negative and statistically significant either in a bad economy or good, or in both. However, in all 
models, the difference between the marginal effects in good and bad economies is not 
statistically significant except for one case where the unemployment rate is examined ignoring 
the election month, and a reverse asymmetry is found rather than a grievance asymmetry.  
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